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Financial  deregulation  in the  1980s saw the  lifting  of  regulations  on 
interest rates charged by banks.  In general, lending rates now respond 
more quickly to changes in banks'  cost of  funds than they did in the 
regulated period.  However, lending rates still do not always move one 
for  one with changes in banks'  marginal cost  of  raising funds.  This 
paper  canvasses  four  theoretical  explanations,  other  than  collusive 
behaviour,  for  loan  rate  stickiness.  These  theories  are  based  on 
equilibrium credit rationing, switching costs, implicit risk sharing and 
consumer irrationality. 
Using regression analysis, we also examine the degree of  stickiness of 
Australian interest rates on secured and unsecured personal loans, credit 
cards, small and large business overdrafts, and housing loans.  We find 
significant differences in the degree of  interest rate stickiness among the 
different rates, even after allowing for lags in adjustment.  The rate on 
credit cards is found to be the most sticky, followed by personal loan 
rates, the housing loan rate and the small business overdraft rate.  The 
large business overdraft rate is found to adjust one for one with banks' 
marginal cost of  funds.  We briefly examine the behaviour of  selected 
U.S., U.K. and Canadian interest rates. The general order and magnitude 
of interest rate stickiness is similar to that found for Australia.  Although 
it  is  not  possible  to  empirically  discriminate  between  the  different 
theories of  loan  rate stickiness, we interpret  the  results  as  providirlg 
strong evidence for the switching cost explanation.  In addition, implicit 
risk  sharing probably plays an important role in the stickiness of the 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The last decade has seen the re-emergence of  interest in issues dealing 
with the operation of the financial system.  This interest has taken both 
theoretical and empirical work in two broad directions.  The first is an 
exploration  of  the links  between  the financial system and aggregate 
economic  activity'.  The  second  direction  focuses  on  more 
rnicroeconomic issues.  Questions such as why do banks exist, how do 
they set interest rates and what type of principal-agent problems arise in 
banking have received considerable attention.  This paper has its roots 
in this second area of  research.  It examines possible reasons, other than 
collusive behaviour, for the stickiness of banks'  loan rates and uses data 
on the various lending rates of  Australian banks to examine the degree 
and causes of  interest rate stickiness2. 
Price  stickiness  has  long  played  a  central  role  in  macroeconomics. 
Paralleling the recent renewed  interest in financial markets, there has 
been renewed interest in the causes of  price stickiness. Many theories of 
slow or incomplete price adjustment in goods and labour markets have 
been suggested.  These include theories based on market structure and 
lack  of  competition,  on  implicit  risk-sharing  contracts,  on  costs  of 
changng prices  and  on  consumer  switching  costs3.  While,  in  the 
banking sector, price stickiness has often been  attributed  to  a lack of 
competition (see Hannan and Liang (1991)), many of  the explanations 
advanced to explain price stickmess in goods markets are also applicable 
to  financial  markets.  For example, Hannan and Berger (1991) use the 
1 See Gertler (1988) for a summary of  this work. 
For a recent empirical evaluation of market structure in the Australian banking 
industry, see Fahrer and Rohling (1992). Testing three types of market structure, they 
find that the hypotheses of  both perfect competition and perfect collusion can be 
rejected, but that Cournot oligopoly cannot be rejected by the data. 
See Blanchard and Fischer (1989) for a summary of  various theories of  price 
rigdi  ty, menu cost model of  Rotemberg and Saloner (1987) to explain stickiness 
in bank deposit rates, while Klemperer (1987) suggests that his model of 
switching costs could also be used for the same purpose.  Fried  and 
Howitt (1980) apply the Azariadis (1976) model of  implicit insurance 
contracts in labour markets to explain loan rate stickiness as a method of 
assuring risk  averse lenders of  a relatively constant  interest  rate.  A 
number of  explanations of  stickiness in lending rates which take into 
account the special nature of  a loan cpntract have also been advanced. 
Amongst these explanations, perhaps the most well known is the work 
of  Stiglitz  and  Weiss  (1981)  which  shows  that  in  an  equilibrium 
characterised by credit rationing, the loan rate may not move when other 
interest rates move. 
In  this paper we pay particular attention to  four explanations of  the 
stickiness of  loan rates charged by banks.  These explanations are based 
on  credit  rationing,  switching  costs,  risk  sharing  and  consumer 
irrationality  . 
The empirical work in this paper examines the behaviour of  different 
lending rates in response to changes in various measures of  the banks' 
cost  of  funds.  In  contrast  to  the  bulk  of  studies  on  interest  rate 
stickiness, we examine the behaviour of  a number of  different Australian 
lending rates.  These include the rates on housing loans, secured and 
unsecured personal loans, business loans and credit cards. For purposes 
of  comparison, we also examine the behaviour of  a number of  interest 
rates in other countries. 
The various rates that we consider apply to loans with different risk 
characteristics  and different  switching costs.  An  examination  of  the 
various  lending rate  responses  to  changes  in  the  cost  of  funds thus 
allows tentative inferences to be drawn as to the source of  any observed 
rigidity.  Our results  do not,  however,  discriminate sharply between 
different  hypotheses.  Such  discrimination  is  made  difficult  by  the 
inability to observe the information costs involved in bank lending. 
The remainder of  the paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 presents 
the four theories of  loan rate stickmess mentioned above.  Section 3 then discusses the data, our empirical strategy and our results.  We find a 
considerable degree of  price stickiness in all lending rates except for the 
indicator rates for business loans.  We interpret our results as providing 
some support for the switching cost explanation although we cannot rule 
out other explanations.  Finally, Section 4 concludes and sumrnarises. 
2. THEORIES OF LOAN RATE  STICKINESS 
In the textbook world of  perfect competition with complete information, 
price equals marginal cost and the derivative of  price with respect  to 
marginal cost equals one.  When the industry moves away from perfect 
competition this derivative typically becomes less than one. For example, 
in the case of  a monopolist facing a linear demand curve, the derivative 
of  price  with  respect  to  marpal cost  equals  0.5.  Similarly,  this 
derivative  is  generally  less  than  one  when  the  perfect  information 
assumption and other implicit  assumptions in  the classical result are 
dropped. In this section, we discuss various theories as to why the price 
of  a bank loan may not respond one for one with the cost of  providing 
a bank  loan.  Specific attention is  given  to  those  explanations which 
consider the peculiarities of  the market for bank loans. 
The focus of  this paper is solely on marginal pricing decisions.  These 
decisions affect the profitability of  the marginal loan. Overall profitability 
is determined by a comparison of  average lending rates and the average 
cost of  funds.  The behaviour of  the spread between these average rates 
is examined in some detail in Reserve Bank of  Australia (1992). 2.1  Adverse Selection 
Perhaps the most well known model concerning agency costs in banking 
is that developed by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).  The firm is assumed to 
know  the  riskiness  of  its  project  while  the  bank  cannot  distinguish 
between projects.  This information asymmetry introduces problems of 
moral hazard and adverse selection.  An increase in the interest rate at 
which investors borrow reduces the expected profit on all investment 
projects.  The safer the project, the greater is this reduction in expected 
return.  This is due to the fact that higher interest rates in states of  the 
world in which risky projects already fail, do not reduce the firm's return 
in those states.  Consequently, when the bank  increases its loan rate, 
those firms with the safest projects will be the first to withdraw from the 
market.  As a result, the mix  of  applicants applying for loans changes 
adversely (adverse selection).  Alternatively, faced with higher interest 
rates, firms may decide to undertake riskier projects (moral hazard). 
The problems induced by asymmetric information mean that an increase 
in the loan rate charged by  the bank  will not necessarily result in a 
proportionate  increase  in  the  expected  receipts  of  the  bank.  If  the 
probability of  default rises sufficiently, the bank's expected receipts may 
actually fall when it increases its loan rate.  Faced with this situation, the 
bank will elect not to increase its lending rate even if  its cost of  funds 
increase.  In such an equilibrium, the bank will set the loan rate below 
the market clearing rate and ration credit.  The interest rate will exhibit 
upward stickiness.' 
This price stickiness result  does not, however, necessarily hold up in 
equilibria in which credit is not being rationed.  Consider a world  in 
~illiamson  (1987) demonstrates that a credit rationing equilibrium can exist in 
the  absence  of  adverse  selection  and  moral  hazard  problems,  although  the 
assumption of  asymmetric information remains critical.  He derives debt contracts as 
an optimal arrangement between borrower and lender. Lenders are assumed to face 
a monetary cost (for example, bankruptcy costs) of  borrower default.  At some point, 
the probability of  default on a given loan increases to such a point that the expected 
additional bankruptcy costs outweigh the additional return.  At this point, the bank 
will find it optimal to no longer increase its lending rate even if  the costs of  funds 
increases. which there are two broad classes of  borrowers to which a bank can 
lend.  For  the  first  class  of  borrower  (such  as  governments),  the 
probability of  default is zero, while for the second class of  borrowers, the 
probability of  default is positive and increasing in the loan interest rate 
(through adverse selection or moral hazard). Assume that the bank can 
distinguish  between  the  two  classes  of  borrowers,  but  not  between 
customers within each  class.  Further,  assume  that  the  bank  is risk 
neutral and thus must earn the same expected return on both classes of 
loans.  Given perfect competition, that rate must be equal to the bank's 
marpal  cost of  funds (q).  That is: 
where R,  is the rate charged on the riskless loan, P(.) is the probability 
of  default on the second class of  loan and R2 is the rate charged on this 
loan.  For  the  first type of  loans dR,/dR,  = 1; that is, changes in the 
bank's costs of  funds get transmitted one for one into changes in the 
lending rate to the riskless borrower.  However, provided the bank is 
lending to the second borrower type, dR2/dR, > 1 since dP/dR2 > 0.  For 
these loans the bank must increase the lending rate by an amount greater 
than the increase in the cost of  funds to compensate for the decrease in 
the probability of  repayment. At some interest rate the bank will not be 
able to put the rate up enough to compensate for this risk and all lending 
will be made to the first type of  borrower.  However, until this happens, 
the interest rate  should not be  sticky on the  risky loans.  In fact, the 
reverse is true;  the  rates on these  loans should be  very sensitive to 
changes in the banksr cost of  funds. 
This model can also be used to examine, more generally, the relationship 
between business risk and the spread between the lending rate and the 
margnal cost  of  funds.  To do this,  suppose that  the  probability  of 
default is a function of  the state of  the economy as well as the interest 
rate. As the state of  the economy worsens, the probability of  loan default 
increases.  In this case, a deterioration in the economy is likely to lead to 
a  widening  of  the  spread between  the  lending  rate  and  the  banksr marginal cost of  funds5.  This can be seen from equation (1).  With the 
marginal cost of  funds (RJ  held constant, the business lending rate (R,) 
must increase if  the probability of  default P(.) increases.  This issue is 
explored in greater detail in Blundell-Wignal and Gizycki (1992). 
2.2  Switching Costs 
In typical markets, say the market for oranges, the seller does not care 
who buys her product; one customer is the same as the next.  Anyone 
who wants to buy oranges at  the listed price can do so.  This is not 
always the case in the bank loan market;  banks are concerned with the 
risk profile and potential behaviour of  their customers.  The bank needs 
to find out some information about the characteristics of  each and every 
buyer.  This is  a costly activity  for the  bank.  This  cost  of  acquiring 
information is  often passed onto the buyer by way of a fixed up-front 
fee.  This fee makes it costly for a buyer to  switch from one bank  to 
another. 
In addition, there are the regular search costs, or "shoe leather" type costs 
of moving from one supply source to another.  Such costs include the 
costs of  learning the different rates  and conditions on the new  loan. 
There are also costs in filling out loan application forms, obtaining the 
relevant documentation, and the time involved in  attending interviews 
with the lending agent.  These "search and application" costs are often 
more significant in banking than in most goods markets because of the 
bank's  need to discover the risk characteristics of  its customers. 
Klemperer (1987) shows that, in general, the existence of  switching costs 
leads  to  market  segmentation,  and reduces  the  elasticity  of  demand 
facing each firm.  Even with non-cooperative behaviour, the switching 
costs  lead  to  outcomes  similar  to  the  collusive  solution,  with  the 
derivative of  price with respect to margnal cost being less than one. 
Klemperer's model, applied to the banking industry, is set out below. 
5 If  the adverse selection problems are sufficiently large (that is, if  aP/aR, is large) 
then it is possible that a deterioration in the state of the world could actually lead to 
a fall in the business lending rate.  This outcome is, however, extremely unlikely. Consider two banks, A and B, producing functionally identical products, 
such as a personal loan.  Assume initially that a fraction d  of  consumers 
are associated with bank A and the remainder ob  (=l-o")  are associated 
with bank B6.  Further assume that q consumers have reservation prices 
r  greater  than  or  equal  to  f(qI7.  Because  of  the  need  to  obtain 
information  about  a  customer,  banks  charge  a  fee  for  new  loan 
applications. In addition consumers face search costs. Assume that these 
search costs vary across individuals.  Let T(w) be the cumulative density 
function of  consumers whose total cost of  switching (that is search costs 
plus establishment fees) to the other bank's  loan  product is less than or 
equal to w.  .Xw) = ar(w)/aw 2  0 is the associated density function.  Let 
h(.) = f-'(.) and assume initially that pa 5 pb, where p is the price of  the 
loan, or the interest rate. 
The demand for bank A's  loans is given by 
and the demand for bank B's  loans by 
The first term in equation (2)  represents bank A's existing market share. 
Since pb is less than pa, some of  A's  borrowers (and potential borrowers) 
will  switch  to  B.  Borrowers  will,  however,  only  switch  if  their 
reservation prices are greater than or equal to pa and switching costs are 
less than or equal to pa-pb. This loss in demand is given by the second 
term in equation (2). 
Demand for bank B's  loans comes from three sources.  First, it sells to its 
own  initial  customers  (the first  term  in  equation  (3)) and  to  those 
customers that were initially borrowing from bank A and who find it 
This association may come from having a deposit history with a particular bank. 
7  f(q) is the inverse demand function if  there were no switching costs. optimal to switch to bank B (the second term).  It will also lend to those 
customers who were originally associated with bank A, but who did not 
borrow from it, and who now find it optimal to switch to bank B (the 
third term). Customers who have a reservation price (r) between pa and 
pb,  and a reservation price less switching costs greater than pb, fall into 
this class. 
Given  these  demand  functions,  it  is  possible  to  derive  the  non- 
cooperative price setting equilibrium.  Choosing bank B,  the first order 
condition for bank B's  profit maximisation problem is given by: 
Where d'  is bank B's  profit function and cb is bank B's  cost function. 
Using equation (3)' equation (4) can be rewritten, 
For a symmetric equilibrium, pa = pb = p and o" = ob  = 1/2.  Equation (5) 
can be rewritten, 
Suppose that all customers face some switching costs, and that switching 
costs are distributed  -  uniformly over the interval [o,E].  Thus $w)  = 1  /k  - 
for 0 I  w < k and y(w) = 0 for w > k. 
Given linear demand p=f(q)  = a - pq, and linear costs ca(q)  = cb(q)  = mq, equation (6) can be solved for the equilibrium price, 
If  = 0 there are no consumers with switching costs and equation (7) 
collapses to  p=m.  That is, price equals marpal cost.  This is same 
outcome as that which is obtained under perfect competition. 
- 
If  some consumers face infinite switching costs, (ie, k = m), equation (7) 
implies p = (a  + m)/2.  This is the same as the monopoly (or collusive 
oligopoly) outcome. In general, the higher the switching costs, the fewer 
consumers are attracted to a price cut, and thus the less likely a bank is 
to initiate a price cut.  For maximum switching costs between 0 and m, 
the pricing solution for the bank lies between the perfectly competitive 
outcome and the monopoly outcome. 
The derivative of  price with respect to marpal  cost is given by: 
[  (a - m)  1 
As  E -+ 0,  @/am  -+  1.  Thus, if  no  consumers face switchmg costs, 
changes in marginal cost are translated one for one into changes in price. 
As  increases, @/am falls and loan rates become more stickf. 
The model above describes a world where people are initially associated 
with a particular bank.  One criticism of  the model is that it assumes 
For example, if a=0.30 (at an interest rate of 30%, the demand for funds is zero), 
rn=0.13  (the  marginal  cost  of  funds  equals  13.0%) and  ;=0.10  (the maximum 
switching costs that anybody faces is 10.0%)  then dp/dm = 0.82. some initial exogenous market share.  However, the market shares may 
be endogenous. That is, banks may compete more vigorously in the first 
period in an attempt to gain market  share, thereby increasing second 
period monopoly power.  In aggregate, however, banks cannot increase 
market share, but the increased competition will dissipate any second 
period rents. 
One response to this criticism is that since customers are aware that the 
switching costs will make them captives of  the bank, and will be under 
possible monopoly power in the second period, they will be less tempted 
to purchase from a bank who has initiated a price cut in the first period. 
The price cut is a signal to the customer that the bank is attempting to 
increase its market share with a view to increasing prices in the second 
period.  First  period  demand  will  then  be  less  elastic  than  in  an 
otherwise identical market  with no switching costs.  This behaviour 
results in price stickmess as described  above.  Further, in the banking 
industry in particular, it is not unreasonable to assume that customers 
w,ho wish  to  borrow  are initially  associated  with  some bank;  either 
through previous lending or the bank providing deposit facilities. 
In the version of  the Klemperer model presented above, the bank's need 
for  information  causes  part  of  the  switching  costs.  Banerjee  and 
Summers (1987) present a model in which there are no information or 
search costs of  switching, but firms introduce artificial switching costs as 
a loyalty inducing device.  This enables firms to split the market and 
thus charge a higher price, as in Klemperer's  model.  Any price cut by 
a single firm must be greater than the switching cost before the firm 
begins to attract consumers from other firms.  With sizeable switching 
costs, there is no incentive to cut prices marginally,  (or chisel as in a 
collusive market) because it would  not  gain  the  firm any customers. 
Furthermore,  it  does not  pay a firm to  lower its price  by  enough  to 
capture the  entire market.  This would  leave the other firm with no 
customers, and in a position to lower its price below the first firm's price. 
The Bertrand pricing solution would result, with price equal to margnal 
cost. 
The positive profits generated in this artificial switching cost model lead to the question of  entry.  Normally, the threat of  entry would force the 
incumbents to price at marginal cost.  However, if entry of  new firms is 
costly,  it  will not  pay  to  enter, as Bertrand  competition  will  result, 
leaving no profits to cover  the cost of  entry.  Given the high costs of 
bank entry, especially at the retail level, banks may have some incentive 
to introduce artificial switchmg costs. 
An earlier model of  markets with switching costs by  Von Weizsacker 
(1984) focuses on a firm's  reputation, and is based partly on work by 
Klein  and Leffler  (1981).  Given  a  market  where  there  are costs  of 
substituting between different products, customers are unwilling to enter 
into a long term arrangement with a firm for fear of  losing rents to the 
firm at a future date.  Finns are able to overcome consumers' reluctance 
by reducing the uncertainty associated with price changes by holding 
prices constant.  In this way, firms may gain valuable reputations by 
acting consistently.  Observed price inertia may thus be an indicator of 
competition, and not an indicator of  collusion.  However, this model 
assumes prices will be fixed in all periods; an unlikely occurrence.  If 
consumers are risk neutral, an alternative outcome is that banks commit 
to tie the interest rate to the observable cost of  funds. 
2.3  Risk Sharing 
If  borrowers are more risk  averse than the shareholders of  the bank, 
there exists an implicit  risk  insurance  argument for  the sticluness  of 
interest rates.  Fried and Howitt (1980), apply the implicit labour contract 
model of  Azariadis (1976) to model this effect.  Given that the borrower 
is risk averse, she prefers stable interest rate payments.  As a result the 
bank charges a less variable interest rate than its margnal cost of funds, 
and the bank is compensated for the additional risk by receiving a higher 
average  rate  than  would  be  charged  to  risk  neutral  borrowers. 
Customers treat this difference as an insurance premium.  Fried  and 
Howitt argue that customers will not change banks when the lending 
rate is higher than the marginal cost of  funds because of  the existence of 
switching  costs.  Since both  parties  face  these  switching  costs,  it  is 
mutually advantageous to maintain a long-term relationship.  The result 
is interest rate stickiness. 2.4  Consumer Irrationality 
Ausubel  (1991) argues that  search or switch costs,  although present, 
cannot provide a full explanation  of  credit  card rate stickiness?  He 
argues that there is a class of  borrowers who repeatedly believe that they 
will pay the outstanding balance before the due date but fail to do so. 
These consumers are insensitive to interest rate changes, and are the class 
of  borrowers that the banks prefer.  High risk credit card borrowers, on 
the other hand, are more likely to be interest rate sensitive because they 
fully intend to borrow on their cards.  A credit card rate reduction will 
only attract customers who fully intend to borrow  (i.e., the high risk 
customers).  This "reverse" adverse-selection problem makes banks less 
likely to compete on credit card rates and thus rates are likely to be 
sticky, especially in the downward direction. 
3. TESTS OF LOAN RATE STICKINESS 
The  empirical  literature  on price  stickiness in  banking  has  typically 
focused on a single deposit or lending rate.  Yet,  casual observation 
suggests considerable variation in the degree of  interest rate stickiness 
across different  products.  The  interest  rate  charged  on credit  cards 
remains constant for  long periods  of  time  while the rate charged on 
overdrafts  changes  regularly.  In  this  section  we  formally  examine 
interest  rates  on a number of  different  types  of  bank  loans  and, by 
examining differences in the degree of  loan rate stickiness, draw some 
tentative inferences concerning the cause of  the sticluness. 
3.1  Data and Estimation Procedure 
Prior  to  the  mid  1980s most  bank  lending  rates  were  the  subject of 
regulation.  For most types of  lendng these regulations were lifted in 
Calem (1992) argues that switching costs are important in the US credit card 
market. When a customer wishes to change credit cards, the new issuer may require 
her to pay off  the balance on the existing card.  This may involve several months of 
curtailed  spending,  and  this  constitutes  a  considerable  switching  cost.  Such 
conditions generally do not exist in Australia. April 1985.  In the case of  overdrafts the maximum rate on all overdrafts 
was set by the  Reserve  Bank prior  to  February  1972".  At  that  time 
interest rates on overdrafts drawn on limits over $50,000 became a matter 
for negotiation between the banks and their customers while those drawn 
under limits less than $50,000 remained regulated.  In February 1976 the 
threshold  level  was  increased  to  $100,000  and  in  April  1985  all 
regulations were lifted. 
From 1966, when personal loans were introduced, the maximum rate that 
banks could charge was set by the Reserve Bank.  Once again, in April 
1985, the  controls were  removed.  At  the  same  time,  the  maximum 
interest rate that could be charged on credit cards was deregulated. Prior 
to this time the maximum rate had been set at 18 per cent per annum. 
The period of  housing loan rate regulation extended beyond that for the 
other lending rates.  Until 1973, the maximum rate that could be charged 
on housing loans was the same as that on overdrafts although banks 
typically  charged  a lower  rate.  In  October  1973 banks  agreed  to  a 
"consultative  maximum"  on  housing  loans  which  was  below  the 
overdraft  rate.  This  was  formalised  in  December  1980  when  the 
maximum rate that could be charged on owner-occupied housing was set 
one percent below  the maximum overdraft rate.  The ceiling on new 
owner-occupied housing loans was finally removed in April 1986. 
In the deregulated period, data on certain actual lending rates is readily 
available.  For example, the actual rate charged on credit card loans is 
directly  observable  and is  the  same for  all  classes of  borrowers.  In 
contrast, banks generally do not publish data on rates actually charged 
on overdrafts. Instead, they typically quote some base or reference rate to 
which a margrn is added to obtain the actual loan rate.  These margins 
are  determined  on  a  case  by  case  basis  and  are  a  function  of  the 
perceived credit worthiness of  the borrower. 
The  quoting  of  reference  rates  for  an increasing  variety  of  lending 
lo Between 1956 and 1962 a maximum for the average overdraft rate charged was 
also set. products makes it difficult to determine the degree of  stickiness of  certain 
actual loan rates.  Conclusions regarding the stickiness of  the reference 
rate do not necessarily translate into conclusions regarding the stickiness 
of  the actual rate charged.  With this caveat in mind we examine three 
overdraft rates. Two of  these rates are the advertised overdraft reference 
rates of  one large Australian bank.  The first of  these two is the reference 
rate for large corporate overdrafts while the second is for small business 
overdrafts.  The third rate used is the rate most commonly charged on 
small business overdrafts by another Australian bank. This rate includes 
the margin but it is only available for a subset of  our sample period. We 
refer  to  this  rate  as the  "standard rate".  In  addition  to  the  above 
overdraft rates we examine the degree of  stickiness in the housing loan 
rate, the credit card rate and a variety of  personal loan rates. 
As detailed above, most lending rate ceilings were lifted in April 1985. 
Where data permits, we begin our sample period in January 1986.  This 
allows a period of  adjustment to the deregulated environment.  For the 
housing loan rate series, the sample period begins in July 1986, while the 
four personal loan rate series are only available after September 1987. 
The  following  table  summarises  details  of  the  rates  used  for  the 
deregulated period. 
-  -  -  -  -  - -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - -  -  T------------------------------------------  T----------------------  7 
Loan Type  /  Rate Description  /  Deregulated  j 
I  I 
I  I 
I  !---------------------+------------------------------------------+----------------------  I 
j  Sample Period  j 
4 
I Personal Loans  i Minimum Rate on Secured Loans  j Sept. 87 - August 91 \ 
I 
I  /  Maximum Rate on Secured Loans  / Sept. 87 - August 91 / 
I 
I 
I  j  Minimum Rate on Unsecured Loans  i  Sept. 87 - August 91 ! 
I 
I 
I  /  Maximum Rate on Unsecured Loans  / Sept. 87 - August 91 i 
I 
I 
I  I  j  Rate on unsecured loans published  j Jan. 86  - August 91  j 
I  I  I 
I  I 
I  by OECD  1  I  b---------------------+------------------------------------------+----------------------  4 
i Housing Loans  j  Owner Occupied Loans  j July 86 - August 91  I 
~---------------------+----------------  t  -  i 
j Credit Card Loans  Rate on cards with 55 day free  Jan. 86 - August 91  j 
I  1  I 
I  I  I 
I  credit  I  b .....................  +  ..........................................  +  ....................  --  4 
1 Business Loans  Reference rate for large borrowers  i Jan. 86 - August 91  \ 
1 
I  /  Reference rate for small borrowers  j Jan. 86 - August 91  j 
I  1 
I 
I  I Most common rate for small  Jan. 86  - April 90 
I 
1  I  I 
I  1  borrowers  I  1 
I  1  I 
L .....................  L  ............................................  L  --A For the period prior to deregulation we examine the unsecured personal 
loan series published by the OECD, the housing loan rate, the credit card 
rate, the minimum rate charged on overdrafts greater than $100,000 (the 
prime  rate)  and the rate  most commonly  charged on small business 
overdrafts (the standard rate).  Further details of  all interest rates used 
are presented in Appendix 1. 
A comparison of the movements of selected rates can be seen in Figure 
1 for the period 1979:l to 1985:3 and in Figure 2 for the period 1985:4 to 
1991:B. 
International comparisons of  lending rate behaviour are made difficult 
by the fact that lending practices differ across countries. In particular, for 
a number of countries, the bulk of  personal and housing lending is done 
by way of fixed interest loans.  The response of interest rates on new 
loans of  this type to changes in the cost of  funds, will be different to that 
of  the response of  interest rates on variables rate loans.  Given that in 
this study we use variable rate loans for Australia, the international rates 
that  we  examine  are restricted  to those  on  variable rate loans.  We 
examine five such rates: the prime lending rates in the United States, 
Canada and the United  Kingdom,  the  mortgage  lending rate  in  the 
United Kingdom and the United States credit card rate.  Further details 
of these  rates,  together  with details of  the  relevant  marginal  cost of 
funds, are available in Appendix 1. 
The standard price stickiness tests involve regressing the loan rate on a 
measure of the banks' marginal cost of  funds.  If  price equals marginal 
cost, changes in the marginal cost of  funds should be transmitted one for 
one into changes in the lending rate.  It is a difficult task to measure the 
exact  marginal  cost  of  funds for  a bank  given  the  range of  funding 
sources and deposit products that are available.  Nevertheless, there are 
observable interest rates which provide satisfactory proxies.  These are 
the bank bill rate and the certificate of  deposit rate (CD rate).  We also 
construct a third measure of the marginal cost of  funds.  This measure 
is a weighted average of  the interest rates paid on fixed deposits over 
$50,000,  the CD rate and the bank bill rate.  The weights used are the shares of  the different liability  classes  in  total  liabilities  (for further 
details see Appendix 1).  The problem with this third measure is that 
using existing liability shares may not capture the true marginal cost of 
funds.  Its advantage is that it uses a wider range of interest rates than 
any single interest rate measures.  Our three measures of the marginal 
cost of  funds all show very similar time profiles and our empirical tests 
revealed similar results for all three measures". 
For brevity, we only report the results using the CD rate. We also report 
initial results using two other measures of the costs of funds. Both are 
weighted average interest rates  that banks  pay on various  classes of 
deposits.  The first rate,  which is labelled  AVERAGE,  is the average 
interest rate that banks pay over all deposits.  The second rate, labelled 
RETAIL,  is  a  weighted  average rate  that  banks  pay  on their  retail 
deposits.  A more complete description of these two rates is given in 
Appendix 1.  Neither of these rates are likely to represent the banks' 
marginal cost of funds but are included for completeness and as a basis 
for comparison. The discussion focuses on the results obtained using the 
CD rate. 
All estimation is carried out using ordinary least squares. All hypothesis 
tests  are  conducted  with  a  covariance  matrix  which  is  robust  to 
conditional heteroskedasticity  and serial  correlation.  The covariance 
matrices are calculated using the Newey-West procedure with 6 lags. 
"  If  the marginal cost of  funds is measured incorrectly then we have a classical 
"errors  in  variables"  problem  with  the  parameter  estimates  being  biased  and 
inconsistent.  In simple one variable regression models it  can be  shown that  (see 
Johns  ton (1972)): 
- .'.P 
plim  0  - P  = - 
a'x 
where dm  is the variance of  the measurement error and d,  is the variance of the 
explanatory variable (in this case the measured marginal cost of  funds).  It can be 
seen that the coefficient is asymptotically biased towards zero and that the extent of 
the bias is a function of  the ratio of  the measurement error variance to the variance 
in the cost of funds. To the extent that any measurement error exists in our measure 
of  the marginal cost of funds, its variance is likely to be small relative to that of  the 
variance of the measured cost of  funds.  Any asymptotic bias due to measurement 
error is thus likely to be  small. There  is  some  debate  over  whether  nominal  interest  rates  are 
characterised by a stationary or by an integrated process. Unfortunately, 
the tests which discriminate between these two alternatives are of  low 
power and of  questionable use over sample periods as short as those 
used in this paper.  We take the view that interest rates are stationary 
and thus classical inference is valid.  For completeness, however, we also 
report in Appendix 2 selected results for regressions where the interest 
rates have been first differenced. 
3.2  Results 
We begin by examining the deregulated period.  Table 1 presents the 
results of  regressing the lending rates on the contemporaneous cost of 
funds  variables.  When  the  CD  rate  is  used,  the  estimates  of  the 
coefficients on the CD rate are in all cases less than one.  In almost every 
case the estimates are sigruficantly less than one.  All the personal loan 
rates, the housing loan rate, the credit card rate,  the most commonly 
charged small business rate and the base rate for small business loans all 
show some degree of  stickiness.  For the large corporate base rate it is 
possible to reject the hypothesis that the coefficient equals one at the 7 
per cent level of  significance. 
When the retail cost of  funds and the average cost of  funds are used, we 
find higher coefficient estimates overall; with  the retail cost generally 
yielding the highest estimates.  For these two cost of  funds variables, the 
coefficient estimates are both above and below one. 
In  Table  2  we  report  marginal  significance  levels  for  tests  of  the 
hypotheses that coefficients on the cost of  funds variables are equal for 
various pairs of  lending rates.  The personal loan rate, the housing loan 
rate and the credit card rate each exhibit significantly more stickiness 
than the base rates and the standard overdraft rate.  We also find that 
there are significantly different degrees of  stickiness between the three 
retail rates with the credit rate being the stickiest and the owner-occupied 
housing  rate  the  least  sticky.  Although  not  reported,  we  find  no 
statistically sigruhcant difference in the degree of price stickiness between 
any of  the four personal loan lending rates. TABLE 1: TESTS OF LOAN RATE STICKINESS: POST DEREGULATION 
LENDING  RATE,= a +  PCOST,  +  E, 
I  I  I  I 













Base (Large)  3.03  1.29  0.95  2.09  1.71  0.84  3.88  0.90  0.94 
(0.68)  (0.07)  (1.07)  (0.12)  (0.82)  (0.05) 
Credit Card  22.87  0.01  -.01  23.65  -0.07  -.01  24.34  -0.10  0.01 
(2.13)  (0.20)  (261) (0.31)  (2.13)  (0.15) 
Housing Loans 
- -  - - - -- -  -  -  - 
Notes: Standard errors appear in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 21 
TABLE 2 :  TEST OF EQUALITY OF COEFFICIENTS: POST DEREGULATION 
Notes: 
1. The entries in each cell are the marginal significance levels for the tests of the 
hypotheses that the coefficient on the cost of  funds variable (P)  in Table 1 are the 
same across the two relevant lending rates.  The three entries in each cell relate to the 
three cost of funds variables.  In order these three variables are: 
1. Average cost 
2. Retail cost 
3. CD rate. 
2. The estimations involving the standard rate are from 1986:l to  1990:4. Comparing the base rates  for small and large business loans we  are 
unable to reject the hypothesis that the two rates exhibit the same degree 
of  stickiness.  We  are, however, able to reject  the hypothesis that the 
standard overdraft rate is characterised by the same degree of  stickiness 
as the base rate for large corporate loans. 
In summary, the results in Tables 1  and 2 suggest the following ranking 
in terms of  the degree of  price stickiness.  The credit card rate is the 
stickiest followed by the personal loan rate, the housing loan rate, the 
standard overdraft rate and finally the base rates. 
The above regressions assume that adjustment of  the lending rate occurs 
in  the  same  period  as  changes  in  the  cost  of  funds.  Such  speedy 
adjustment may not always take place.  The transmission of the change 
in  the  cost  of  funds may  be  spread out over  a  number  of  months. 
Accordingly, we included a number of  lags of  the cost of  funds in the 
estimated  equations.  Table  3 presents  estimates  of  the  sum of  the 
coefficients on the contemporaneous and lagged variables for different 
lag lengths. It also reports the marginal significance levels for tests of  the 
hypotheses that the sum of  the coefficients on the lags equal one.  The 
same number of  observations have been used for all lag lengths so that 
the  sum  of  the  coefficients  is  directly  comparable  across  different 
numbers of  lags. 
In all cases adding lags increases the sum of  the coefficients, suggesting 
some delay in adjustment of  lending rates.  However, in general, the 
basic  conclusions drawn from  using  only  the  contemporaneous  rate 
remain unchanged. For the housing, credit cards and personal loan rates, 
the ranking in terms of  the degree of  stickiness is maintained. Even after 
nine lags are included the sum of  the coefficients on all three of  these 
rates  remain  significantly  less  than  one.  The  same  is  true  for  the 
standard overdraft rate.  In the case of  the small business base rate it is 
possible to reject the hypothesis that the sum of  the coefficients on  the 
contemporaneous and lagged cost of  funds equal one when only one lag 
is included, but it is not possible to do so when three or more lags are 
included.  For  the  large  loan  base  rate  the  sum of  the  coefficients 23 
TABLE 3: TEST OF LAG  SIGNIFICANCE: POST DEREGULATION 
Notes: 
1. The estimation period for these regressions is from 1986:lO to 1991:8 for all rates 
except the housing rate, which is estimated from 1987:4 to 1991:8, and the standard 
rate, which is estimated from 1986:lO to 1990:4. 
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(0.00) generally increases with the addition of lags, however, it is not possible 
to reject the hypothesis that the sum of  the coefficients equals one even 
when no lags are included. 
If  interest rates are sticky, declines in the banks'  costs of  funds will not 
be passed completely into lending rates.  This incomplete pass-through 
during the interest rate reduction phase has sometimes led to the claim 
that banks are exploiting their customers by increasing their lending rates 
when the cost of  funds increase, but not reducing their rates when the 
cost of  funds declines1'.  One way to test such a claim is to estimate the 
stickiness equations with separate parameter estimates for the cases when 
the cost of  funds decrease and increase.  This is done by defining two 
dummy variables, one of  which takes a value equal to one when the cost 
of  funds declines, and the other takes a value equal to one when the cost 
of  funds remains  the  same or  increases.  The  cost  of  funds is  then 
multiplied by each of  the dummy variables to obtain two new variables 
which  replace  the  original  cost  of  funds  variable  in  the  estimated 
equation. 
The results are reported in Table 4.  For the majority of  the interest rates 
examined it is possible to reject the hypothesis that interest rates respond 
symmetrically to cost of  funds increases and decreases.  However, in all 
cases the  coefficient  on  the  cost  of  funds is hgher when  the cost  is 
decreasing.  There is no evidence that banks are consistently slower to 
bring  down  their  lending rates  than  they  are  to  increase  them.  If 
anything,  the  reverse  is  true.  For  the  personal  lending  rates,  the 
reference rates and the home loan rate, the coefficient on the cost  of 
funds variable is significantly greater when the cost of  funds is falling 
than when it is increasing.  However, the differences in the speed with 
which rates are adjusted up and down are quite small.  For the credit 
card and the standard overdraft rate, there is no signiiicant difference 
between the two coefficients. 
12  For  example, when  monetary  policy  was  eased  in  November  1991, some 
consumers complained banks  were not  passing on  the interest  rate cuts fully to 
mortgage rates.  See  Gittins (1991) for an account of  the debate. TABLE 4: TESTS OF SYMMETRICAL RESPONSES 





1. Standard errors appear in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
2. UP is  a dummy variable (1 when the CD rate increases) multiplied by the CD rate. 
DOWN is  a dummy variable (1 when the CD rate decreases) multiplied by the CD rate. In Table 5 we report the results of  the tests of  interest rate stickiness for 
the pre-deregulation period commencing in January 1979 and ending in 
March 1985. Although there were ceilings on all lending rates (with the 
exception of  the prime rate) before 1985, these ceilings moved to some 
extent with the cost  of  funds.  Figure 2  shows the movement of  the 
various lending rates. 
As expected, the results in Table 5 show that the prime lending rate is 
again the most flexible interest rate.  However, it is less flexible than in 
the deregulated period.  Even when nine lags are included, the full effect 
of  changes in the marginal cost of  funds is not translated into the prime 
rate. The personal loan rate, the housing rate and the standard overdraft 
rate  all  show  the  same degree of  stickiness.  Again,  when  lags are 
included, the sum of  the coefficients increases, but for all three interest 
rates the sum is always less than 0.5.  The credit card rate is constant at 
18 per cent through the entire sample.  Comparing the pre- and post- 
deregulation periods, we find no change in the stickiness of  the personal 
loan rate.  We do, however, find that the housing rate and the standard 
overdraft  rate  are more flexible  in  the  deregulated  period.  For  the 
standard overdraft rate this difference is particularly pronounced.  In 
summary,  a  comparison  of  the  pre-  and  post-deregulation  results 
suggests that deregulation has meant that rates on housing and business 
loans now move more closely with the cost of  funds.  In contrast, the 
rates  on  personal  loans and credit  cards do not  appear to  be  more 
flexible in the deregulated period. 
As one final exercise, we examine the behaviour of  a number of  lending 
rates in other countries.  The results are reported in Table 6.  The degree 
of  loan rate stickiness in the other countries examined is similar to that 
for Australia.  In all three cases, the coefficient on the prime rate exceeds 
0.9.  For the U.S. and the U.K., it is not possible to reject the hypothesis 
that the coefficient on the cost of  funds is different from one.  While the 
hypothesis  can  be  statistically  rejected  for  the  Canadian  prime  rate 
regression, the coefficient is economically close to one.  As is the case in 
Australia,  the  housing  rate  in  the  U.K.  exhibits  considerably  more 
stickiness than the prime rate; the hypothesis that the coefficient equals 
one can be  easily  rejected.  Similarly, the credit card rate in  the U.S. TABLE 5:  TESTS OF LOAN RATE  STICKINESS: PRE-DEREGULATION 
JANUARY 1979 - MARCH 1985 
LENDING  RATE, = a +  2=Pi CD  RATE,+,  +  e, 
Notes: 
1.  Standard errors are in parentheses () below coefficient estimates, and marginal 
significance levels are in curly brackets () below summed coefficient estimates. 
2. The parameters in the first two columns are estimated using monthly data over the 
period January 1979 to March 1985. For all estimation in which lags are included, the 
sample begins in October 1979. 
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(0.00) TABLE 6:  TESTS OF LOAN RATE STICKINESS: OTHER COUNTRIES 
LENDING RATE,= a + PCOST,  +  E, 
Notes: 
1.  Standard errors appear in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
2.  The U.S. credit card rate equation is estimated using quarterly data. exhibits  extreme  stickiness,  bearing  virtually  no  relationship  to  the 
marginal cost of  funds; again a similar result to the Australian case. 
3.3 Discussion 
Clearly, there  are different  degrees of  flexibility in the loans rates of 
various lending products. While our tests do not allow us to distinguish 
accurately between the different theories of loan rate stickiness discussed 
in Section 2, the results do suggest a number of  conclusions. 
First, the fact that the minimum and maximum secured and unsecured 
personal loan rates all exhibit the same degree of  stickiness, suggests that 
the credit rationing argument is  not solely responsible for the stickiness 
of personal loan rates. If  the credit rationing argument were correct, then 
one would expect that the maximum rate on unsecured  loans would 
exhibit greater stickmess than the minimum rate on secured loans.  The 
maximum unsecured rate is charged to those customers whose "type" the 
bank is most unsure of.  In contrast, the bank is more likely to be able to 
observe the type of  customers who provide the bank with collateral and 
are charged the minimum rate.  Thus, if  any class of  borrowers were to 
be credit rationed, it should be those customers paylng the highest rate. 
There is no evidence that the interest rate charged to these customers 
responds  any  differently  than  that  charged  to  other  personal  loan 
customers.  While the possibility exists that all personal loan customers 
are credit rationed  and thus all rates behave in  the same manner, we 
view  this as unlikely.  Instead, we regard  switching  costs, especially 
search costs, as the likely explanation of  the stickiness in personal loan 
rates. 
We suggest a similar explanation for the stickiness in housing loan rates. 
Housing lenlng is considered to be amongst the safest forms of  bank 
lending.  Banks  are able to  inspect  and value the collateral for these 
loans, and the actions of  the borrower are unllkely to prejudice the value 
of  the  collateral  or  the  "outcome of  the  project".  Neither  are  there 
significant problems in working out the type of  the borrower, as most 
projects  (i.e.,  houses)  are of  similar risk.  Thus,  we  view  the  credit rationing explanation as being an unlikely source of the stickiness in the 
owner-occupied housing rate. 
As discussed above, the switching costs of  moving from one housing 
loan to another are high, especially when mortgage stamp duty is taken 
into account.  Mortgages  typically  have  had  loan  establishment  fees 
which  vary  according  to  the  size  of  the  mortgage.  For  a  $100,000 
mortgage  loan  establishment  fees  have  typically  exceeded  $1,000 
although in recent times there appears to have been some reduction in 
these fees.  In addition, to move a mortgage of  $100,000 from one bank 
to  another  costs  approximately  $340  in  stamp duty13.  Furthermore, 
some banks charge an early repayment fee amounting to one months 
interest payment if  the loan is paid  out early.  Finally, there are the 
standard search and information costs of  applying for a new housing 
loan.  All these various costs make it a costly exercise for the borrower 
to switch banks.  The theory presented in Section 2 suggests that these 
costs cause stickiness in the housing rate. 
The risk sharing argument may also play some role in explaining the 
stickiness of  the housing rate.  The household sector is, in all likelihood, 
more risk averse than shareholders of  the banks.  As discussed in Section 
2,  the stickiness of  the loan rate on owner-occupied housing may be, in 
part,  due to an implicit insurance contract between  the bank  and its 
customers. Conditional upon the CD rate being the appropriate marginal 
cost of  funds for housing lending, the implicit ex post risk premium does 
not seem to have been  very large.  Over the period  January 1987 to 
August 1991 the housing rate was, on average, 1.13 percentage points 
above the CD rate, while the prime rate was 2.03% above the CD rate". 
l3 The establishment fee on mortgages is based on the amount of  the loan with 
the fee increasing with  the loan  size but at a decreasing rate.  The stamp duty is 
calculated as $7.50 on  the first $16,000  and $4.00  on each $1,000  thereafter.  Some 
banks also charge a regstration fee, a discharge fee, and a title search fee. These fees 
amount to approximately an additional $100.00. 
14 The National Australia Bank's submission to the "Martin Inquiry" (1991) into 
the  banking  industry,  stated  "we see  housing lending  as  involving  a long  term 
relationship with customers and the household sector preferring a degree of stability 
in the interest rates which they face." In recent times, competition in the housing and business lending sector 
has seen reductions in switching costs. At least one bank has waived the 
usual establishment fee for business customers of  another bank.  It has 
also  promised  to  pay  the  government  stamp  duty  and  financial 
institutions duty on opening a new account.  Such developments, if they 
become more widespread, should ensure that interest rates follow the 
cost of  funds more closely. 
However,  there  is  the  possibility  that  these  policies may  only be  an 
attempt  to  increase  market  share,  with  the  special  discounts  being 
removed in the second period when the bank has "captured" its new 
customers.  Second period prices can then be increased without fear of 
losing customers. If  consumers anticipate this behaviour, then these first 
period cost reducing policies will be of  limited success in gaining market 
share. 
The  credit  card  industry  is  another  market  where  both  search  and 
switching  costs  are  likely  to  be  present.  Consumers  face  some 
information costs when determining the lowest interest rate offered by 
banks on their credit cards.  They also face the costs of  time and effort 
of  applying for a card, and the cost of  the time lag between applying for 
a card and receiving one.  These costs are, however, small compared to 
those incurred in switching a mortgage from one bank to another. 
Ausubel (1991), using U.S. data, finds that switching costs are not large 
enough to be  the  sole explanation  for  the  credit card rate  stickiness. 
Instead,  he  argues  consumer  irrationality  may  exist,  leading  to  the 
reverse  adverse  selection  problem  described  in  Section  2.  Ausubel 
presents  some  evidence  hom a  respected  consumers  survey  report 
indicating that  the majority  of  consumers say that  they  hlly pay  the 
outstanding balance on their creht card.  However, bank data on credit 
card usage indicates that the number of  accounts incurring credit card 
rate charges is in excess of  75 per cent., Consumers, in effect, say one 
thing but  do another.  Some prima  facia  evidence for reverse adverse 
selection can be found by looking at Figure 2.  Over the period of  study, 
credit card interest rates have monotonically increased, even though the 
cost of  funds has both increased and decreased over the same period. If  reverse adverse selection characterises the credit card market, then in 
certain circumstances, there may exist a role for government to encourage 
lower rates of  interest on cards.  If  a single bank attempts to lower its 
credit card rate unilaterally, it will primarily attract the interest sensitive 
customers. These customers represent high risk borrowers.  Thus, when 
a  single  bank  reduces  its  credit  card  rate,  it  worsens  its  pool  of 
customers.  In this case, declines in the marginal cost of  funds may not 
be translated in changes in credit card rates as no bank wishes to move 
first.  In such an environment, a co-ordinated reduction in interest rates 
may be desirable.  This co-ordination could come through government 
initiatives. 
The evidence on the base rates suggest that the small business rate may 
move slightly more slowly than the large rate, although the differences 
are statistically insignificant.  They both appear to move in line with the 
CD rate.  On the other hand,  the standard rate is considerably more 
sticky. This apparent contradiction can be partially resolved by recalling 
that the base rate is the rate offered to the bank's best small business 
borrowers. The standard rate is the rate applicable to the bank's average 
small  business  borrowers.  The  fact  that  the  average rate  is sticky 
suggests that some of  the rates across the spectrum of  a banks small 
business customer base are sticky.  One would expect the banks to be 
lending at or near the base rate to their best business customers.  This 
implies the remaining, (higher risk) borrowers face stickier interest rates. 
This  result  is  not  inconsistent  with  credit  rationing.  Because  of 
information  and  monitoring  problems,  the  riskier  small  business 
borrowers are more likely  to be credit rationed, causing their interest 
rates to be sticky. 
The move to quote all business lending rates as a margn  over a base rate 
may have  caused lending rates to  all business  groups to move more 
closely in line with the marginal cost of  funds; that is, there may have 
been  a  change  in  the  pricing  policy  of  banks.  Given  the  lack  of 
appropriate data we are unable to test this hypothesis. 4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This paper examines the degree of  price stickiness in the market for bank 
loans.  In the classical world of  perfect competition, changes in marpal 
costs are translated into similar changes in the price of  the product.  We 
find that complete pass-through of  changes in banks'  marginal cost of 
funds only occurs with the base or reference overdraft rates to large and 
small business  borrowers.  For  credit  cards, personal  loans,  owner- 
occupied housing loans and the standard overdraft rate, changes in the 
banks'  marginal cost of  funds have not been translated one for one into 
the contemporaneous lending rates. 
We discuss four explanations for the stickiness of  most of  the lending 
rates.  The first explanation relies on the existence of  equilibrium credit 
rationing. In such an equilibrium, banks will be unwilling to increase the 
lending rate, even when the cost of  funds increase, for fear of reducing 
their expected return.  The second explanation relies on the fact that the 
nature of  a bank loan requires the bank to obtain information about each 
and every customer. The incidence of  these information costs falls on the 
borrower in terms of  upfront fees and search costs.  These costs reduce 
the elasticity of  demand, giving the bank some market power. Third, the 
stickiness in the loan rate may be the result of  an implicit risk sharing 
contract between the bank and its customers.  Finally, we discuss a form 
of  consumer irrationality in the credit card market. 
The results presented in this paper do not allow us to distinguish sharply 
between these different hypo  theses.  To do this would require extensive 
data on the cost of  information collection by both banks and customers. 
Evidence on the notoriously difficult to measure degrees of  risk aversion 
and consumer rationality  would  also be  required.  Nevertheless,  the 
results point in particular directions. 
We find little support for credit rationing being the explanation of  loan 
rate  stickiness.  For  the  housing  loan  rate,  switching costs and risk 
sharing appear to be important causes of  the interest rate stickiness. For 
the personal loan rate, switching costs are again likely to play a role; 
however, the failure of  the behaviour of  the personal loan rate to adjust after  deregulation  may  reflect  a  lack  of  competition  in  this  market. 
Evidence from the standard or most commonly charged rate to small 
business borrowers suggests some interest rate stickiness. 
In summary, there are solid reasons for bank lending rates not moving 
one-for-one  with  the  banks'  marginal  cost  of  funds.  Incomplete 
adjustment  of  lending  rates  does  not  necessarily  imply  collusive 
behaviour amongst the banks. The peculiar nature of  a banking contract, 
in which the seller (the bank) acquires information about the buyer (the 
borrower)  but  is  not  able  to  control  either  the  buyer's  actions,  or 
determine  her  true  type,  can  help  explain  incomplete  pass-through. 
Whle little can be done about "switch costs" which arise directly from 
the costs of  information gathering, reducing artificial switch costs is likely 
to reduce any market power that banks enjoy.  This could be done by 
eliminating mortgage stamp duty and by banks providing more extensive 
and  accessible information  about the terms and conditions of  various 
loans. 35 
APPENDIX 1: DATA 
INTEREST RATES 
(A) Personal lending rates 
Personal lending rates were obtained from two sources. The first source 
is  from  the  OECD Financial  Statistics,  (Part  1,  Section  2:  Domestic 
Markets  -  Interest  Rates).  The  rate  shown  is  the  predominant  rate 
charged by major banks, as at the end of  the month.  It is an effective or 
reducing rate, not a flat rate.  The second source is the maximum and 
minimum variable personal loan rates, secured and unsecured, obtained 
from a major Australian bank. 
(B) Overdraft Rates 
(i) Standard Rate 
This rate, obtained from internal RBA  sources, is reported by one of  the 
major  Australian  banks.  It  is  the  most  commonly  charged  rate  to 
borrowers for overdrafts of  less than $100,000, typically small business 
borrowers.  In May 1990, a retail index rate was introduced.  Loans to 
small businesses are expressed as the retail index rate plus a margin. 
(ii) The Rate on Overdrafts of  $100,000 and Over 
The minimum of  a range of  indicator rates reported by  major banks. 
This rate is used for the pre-deregulation period.  RBA  Bulletin, Table 
F.3. 
(iii) Reference Rate for Large Borrowers 
The National Australia Bank Benchmark Rate applies to the Corporate 
Clients accounts.  End month or near end-month figures obtained from 
the Monday edition of  the Australian Financial Review. 
(iv) Reference Rate for Small Borrowers 
The National Australia Base Rate applies to the retail and commercial 
accounts.  End month or near end month figures are obtained from the 
Monday edition of  the Australian Financial Review. (C) Credit Card Lending Rates 
This  rate is  from  internal  RBA  sources, and is  an  average  of  rates 
reported  by  the major banks  on a bankcard  with  55  day free credit 
facil;  ty. 
(D) Housing Loan Rate 
The housing loan rate to individuals for owner occupation is from the 
RBA Bulletin, Table F.3.  This is a predominant rate on variable interest 
rate loans. 
BANKS'  COST OF FUNDS 
We have constructed three different measures of costs of  funds; retail, 
wholesale and total.  The "retail rate" is a weighted average interest rate 
of  current deposits, fixed deposits less than $50,000, passbook, statement 
and investment accounts and "Other" (Cash management accounts). The 
"wholesale rate" is  a weighted  average interest rate of  fixed  deposits 
greater  than  $50,000,  certificates  of  deposits  and  foreign  currency 
deposits.  The broadest measure is the total weighted average deposit 
rate.  This rate takes into account all the major deposit sources available 
to a bank. 
The deposit categories and corresponding interest rates, along with their 
source are listed below. EEMENTS OF COST OF EUNDS MEASURES 
Current: Not  Table D.l plus gov't  deposits, 
bearing  I Table B.2.  Prior Jan. 1989, 
interest  1  gov't  from TB liab. Table C. 1 






The breakdown of  trading 
bank fixed  deposits, including 
government, into large and 
small are available from 
internal RBA sources, prior to 
January 1989. From this date, 
All bank fixed divided using 





Savings Bank  Prior to January  1989,  from 
Fixed  1  Table E.1 (Discontinued). 
Includes gov't  deposits.  Now 
in All Bank Liab. Table B.2 
INTEREST 
RATE  1 
0 rate applied 
Current account 
rate 
Supplied by  a 
major Australian 
bank 
3 month to 
maturity rate, 
Table F.3 
This is the most 
common maturity 







Dec 88), and 
Table F.3 
Weighted average 
rate available to 
Dec.  1988. From 
this date, the 3 
month to maturity 
is most common 




Assumes all S.B. 
fixed deposits are 
less than $50,000 
Investment  As above, Table B.2  Investment 
accounts, Table 
F. 3 
Average of  min 




As  above, Table B.2  Statement 
accounts, Table 
F. 3 
As  above, Table B.2  Passbook 
accounts, Table 
F. 3 
Internal RBA sources indicate 
these deposits are Cash 
Management Accounts.  Table 
B  .2 
CMA rate 
Predominant rate  I1 
Average of  min 






of  Deposits 
em  market rates  1 
Foreign 
Currency 
Table B.2. Prior Jan.  1989,  CD rate Table 
from Table C. 1  1  F.3 
Weighted average 
issue yield  11 
Foreign currency liabilities, 
Table B. 1 
90 day bank 
bill rate 
I 
No  rate is 
available. Assume INTEREST RATES: OTHER COUNTRIES 
UNITED STATES 
Prime Rate 
The prime rate is from the Federal Reserve Bulletin, Table 1.33, "Prime 
rate charged by banks on short-term business loans".  The interest rates 
are recorded  on the  date when  they change, allowing an end-month 
series to be constructed. 
Credit Card Rate 
The credit card rate is from the ~ederal  Reserve Bulletin, Table 1.56, 
"Terms of  Consumer Installment Credit", item 4, Credit card. The series 
is available on a quarterly basis only. 
Certificate of Deposit 
The cost of  funds measure is from the Federal Reserve Bulletin, Table 
1.35,  "Interest  Rates  Money  Market  and Capital  Markets",  item  12, 
Certificates of  Deposits, secondary market, 3-month. 
UNITED KINGDOM 
Prime Rate 
The  prime  or  base  rate  is  from  Central  Statistical  Office,  Finance 
Statistics, published by the Government Statistical Senrice, England, Table 
13.10 "Selected Retail Banks: Base Rates".  The prime rate is recorded on 
the date when they are changed, allowing an end-month series to be 
constructed. 
Housing Lending 
The  variable  mortgage  rate  on  housing  lending  is  from  the  OECD 
Financial Statistics, Monthly, Part 1 Section 2.  Table R.2/17.  "Lending 
and Borrowing Rates".  Item 111  l(c) Building society mortgage loans, 
nominal rate. 
Certificates of Deposit 
The  cost  of  funds measure  is  the  Sterling  certificates of  deposits  3 months, from Central Statistical Office, Finance Statistics, published by 
the  Government  Statistical Service,  England,  Table  13.8 "Short Term 
Money Rates: Last Friday of  the Period".  The minimum of  the range of 
rates is used. 
CANADA 
Prime Rate 
The prime rate is from the Bank of  Canada Review, Table F1  "Financial 
Market Statistics", Chartered Banks Administered Interest Rates - Prime 
Business.  Figures are the last Wednesday of  the month. 
Banker's  Acceptances 
The measure of  the cost of  funds is from the Bank of  Canada Review, 
Table F.1 "Financial Market Statistics". As no Certificate of  Deposit rate 
is available, we use the Banker's Acceptances rate, 1  month.  Figures are 
the last Wednesday of  the month. APPENDIX 2 
REGRESSIONS USING THE CHANGE IN INTEREST RATES 
1986:l 1991:8 
ALending  rate,  = a  +  Cp.AcDr~te,+~  +  e, 
Notes: 
1. Standard errors are in parentheses  () below  coefficient estimates, and marginal 
significance levels are in curly brackets () below summed coefficient estimates. 
2. The parameters in  the first two columns are estimated  from 1986:l to 1991:8 for 
except for the standard rate, which is estimated from 1986:l to 1990:4 and the housing 
rate, which is estimated from 1986:7 to 1991:8.  For all estimation in  which lags are 
included, estimation is 1986:lO to 1991:8, except for the housing rate, which begins 
in 1987:4, and the standard rate, which is estimated from 1986:lO to 1990:4. 41 
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